TIME: Almanac 1995

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<text id=91TT2492> <title> Nov. 11, 1991: Why Should Americans Care? </title> <history> TIME--The Weekly Newsmagazine--1991 Nov. 11, 1991 Somebody's Watching </history> <article> <source>Time Magazine</source> <hdr> WORLD, Page 56 MIDDLE EAST Why Should Americans Care? </hdr><body> The need for a prompt resolution of hostilities may not seem urgent, but the U.S. vital interest in peace By Jill Smolowe--Reported by Dean Fischer and J.F.O. McAllister/Madrid So why should Americans care whether anything comes of the peace process set in motion last week in Madrid? Are the stakes high enough to justify the considerable investment of President Bush's time and prestige? Do the risks of failure outweigh the potential gains? Is "peace in the Middle East" something Americans really need--or one of those diehard shibboleths that keep successive U.S. Administrations chasing around the track? Ironically, if the prospects for peace in this perpetually troubled region have never looked brighter, the need for a prompt resolution of the Middle East's age-old hostilities has seldom seemed less urgent. The cold war is over, so U.S. fears of a regional tussle escalating into a superpower conflagration have subsided. Immediate threats to Israel's security are not much in evidence. Syria, despite a potent army, is no longer able to tap Moscow for funds and is wooing Washington to attract trade and investment. Egypt has a de jure peace with Israel, Jordan a de facto one. Lebanon is struggling after 16 years of civil war. Iraq is prostrate. And the Palestinians are virtually without patrons. The threat of an oil embargo that could paralyze the U.S. seems distant, given Washington's strong post-Desert Storm ties with Saudi Arabia. Even the hostage crisis is subsiding. But the short answer is yes, Middle East peace is important to our own well-being. It is not just a moral obligation--though, for a democracy and superpower, it is very much that. The U.S. has a tangle of specific strategic, political and economic interests in the region that ought to make Americans care about achieving peace--and its corollary, stability. While the gulf war forced Israel and its Arab neighbors to the same side of the barricades, the alliance was temporary. The Arab-Israeli conflict remains a festering wound that prevents all the nations of the region from concentrating on economic and political improvement. The enmity bars Arab states from fully embracing Washington. It continues to spawn terrorist attacks throughout the region, including strikes on American targets like last week's rocket hit on the U.S. embassy in Beirut. And it compels Washington to remain fixated on Israel's security, a posture that fuels anti-American sentiment--and costs U.S. taxpayers a bundle. The absence of a secure and stable peace gives all hostile parties a ready excuse to continue building their military arsenals. "In any future war lurks the danger of weapons of mass destruction," Bush warned in Madrid last week. Israel is assumed to have a nuclear capability, and Iran and Iraq are in hot pursuit of the same. Iraq has already demonstrated its willingness to take on the American military juggernaut. As long as there is an Arab vein to tap that longs for the destruction of Israel--and by association, the U.S.--the Saddam Husseins of the world pose a genuine threat to American interests. Islamic fundamentalism also challenges U.S. interests not merely in the Middle East but as far west as Morocco, as far east as Pakistan and as far north as the Central Asian republics of the Soviet Union. Fundamentalists toppled the Shah of Iran, leading to the 444-day hostage crisis, and gunned down Egypt's Anwar Sadat. So too could they dispense with the friendly rulers--all too many of them dictators and monarchs--upon whom Washington currently counts. Perhaps the only hope of declawing Islamic radicals is to resolve the Palestinian question, thereby denying them one of their best vehicles for inflaming Muslim passions. Instability also provides a handy excuse for the region's autocratic leaders to forswear democratic reform and continue their ironfisted rule. The oil threat also remains real. U.S. links to Arab oil-producing states, strengthened during the gulf war, could weaken again if hostilities with Israel flare anew. The U.S. survived the disruptions of Kuwaiti and Iraqi oil shipments during the gulf war by tapping into stockpiles and benefiting from a Saudi boost in production. That experience has done nothing to convince Americans that they need to fashion a new, conservation-oriented energy policy; U.S., as well as European and Japanese, dependence on Arab oil remains acute. Warns a British diplomat: "Anyone who suggests that the West, including the U.S., doesn't need Middle East oil is living in a fantasy world." On the downside, taking the lead in trying to make peace also risks a surge of radicalism and extremism if the talks break down. Arab states that came to expect a peace dividend as the implicit payoff for their cooperation in the U.S.-directed coalition against Iraq could grow hostile--especially if Israel is the main spoiler. The intifadeh could reignite. Hard-line factions within the Palestine Liberation Organization might grab control. A new round of hostage taking could commence, and the safety of the remaining captives would be jeopardized. If the talks prove nasty enough, war might even erupt between Israel and Syria. All of this would chip away at U.S. prestige and influence--or even endanger Americans directly. But Bush's "vision thing" is real too. If the U.S. hopes to be the guiding force in the new world order, it must prove its commitment to the pursuit of such principles as democracy, cooperation and conciliation. After pulling out the stops to win the war in Iraq, the U.S. must demonstrate that it will go just as far to win the peace. "A lot of people at the U.N., including our European allies as well as the Third World, look at the way we handle the Arab-Israeli conflict as a litmus test for our role in the post-cold war world," says Shibley Telhami, who was born a Palestinian Christian in Israel and served as an adviser to the U.S. delegation to the U.N. during the gulf war. The choice for Washington is not between sitting back cost free or taking a risk for peace. Rather, the choice is to intervene now, when the chances for success are highest, or to be sucked back into the Middle East maelstrom later, when there is no chance at all. </body></article> </text>